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POINT I 
UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS PLAINTIFFS CONTENTION THAT FINDERS 
AGREEMENTS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.. 
Plaintiffs Brief cited Palmer v. Whaler, 285 P.2d 8 (Cal 1955) as authority for the 
proposition that a finders agreement does not fall within the purview of 25-5-4(5) of the 
Utah Code. Defendant's brief bitterly attacked that California case and concluded that "it 
now stands as no more than a lifeless relic . . . the case is dead." Brief of Respondants p. 6. 
Although this court has not ruled on that precise point, it has ruled on the analagous issue 
of whether or not a contract to procure a lease fell within §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Code. The 
case of Wooley v. Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329 concluded that, 
"Although it may be that there is as good reason why the Legislature should 
have included agreements for rental of nrnnertv in the statute rpnnirina curb 
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agreements to be in writing, as there is for a sale, they did not do so. They 
announce the policy; we interpret it. For us to interpret the statute that the 
words 'purchase or sell' are equivalent to 'rental' is 'inconsistent with the 
manifest intent***' expressed by the statute and would amount to extending it 
by judicial legislation. 
The court's reasoning is analagous to the case at bar. This court should not extend the 
clear and unambiguous mandate of the legislature to cover finders agreements. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT, AS THE MOVING PARTY, HAS THE BURDEN TO SHOW THAT 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Defendant's brief assailed the short affidavit of plaintiff Calvin Florence by saying, 
"Appellants failed to show any issue of material fact, and the trial court had no choice but 
to grant summary judgment to the defendants . . . if appellants failed to submit sufficient 
evidence under Rule 56(e) to warrant a trial on the matter, it is not the fault of 
Respondants." 
Defendant wrongfully assumes that Rule 56(e) places the burden on plaintiff to show that 
there is no fact issue. In analyzing an identical statute the Kentucky Supreme Court has 
reasoned that, 
"The operation is, however, somewhat different where the motions are made 
by the opponent of the party with the trial burden. Assume, for example, that 
the movant is the defendant who is attacking the merits of plaintiff's claim. On 
motion for directed verdict the party resisting the motion, i.e., the plaintiff, has 
had to and has presented his evidence, which is then scrutinized by the motion. 
On motion for summary judgment by a defendant on the ground that plaintiff 
has no valid claim, the defendant, as the moving party, has the burden of 
producing evidence, of the necessary certitude which negatives the opposing 
party's (plaintiff's) claim. This is true because the burden to show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact rests on the party moving for summary 
judgment, whether he or his opponent would at trial have the burden of proof 
on the issue concerned; and rests on him whether he is by it required to show the 
existence or non-existence of facts." (Emphasis added.) 6 Moore's Federal 
Practice par. 56.15[3], p. 2341 (2d ed. 1966)". Barton v. Gas Service Company, 
423 S.W. 2d 902 (Ky 1968). See also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & CO., (1970) 398 
U.S. 144. 
Not only does the moving party have the burden of proof, he has a particularly heavy 
burden. In construing an identical statute the Texas Supreme Court has held that, 
The two quotations illustrate a basic fallacy frequently found in the approach Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment in favor of a defendant. In such cases, the question on appeal, as well 
as in the trial court, is not whether the summary judgment proof raises fact 
issues with reference to the essential elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of 
action, but is whether the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of 
law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential 
elements of the plaintiff's cause of action." Gibbs v. General Motors 
Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Texas 1970). 
The foregoing legal analysis is important for it shows that it is the defendant's affidavit 
which must be placed under the microscope. The adequacy of plaintiff's affidavit is no issue 
until after the moving party's affidavit "establishes as a matter of law that there is no 
genuine issue of fact." 
Defendant's affidavit failed to meet this burden in any number of instances. For example, 
plaintiff's complaint raises the issue of bad faith. A bad faith refusal to sell will not defeat a 
claim for a commission by one who has procured a buyer who is ready, willing and able to 
buy. Lindsey v. Cranfill, 297 P.2d 1055 (N.M. 1956). Defendant's affidavit did not show as 
a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of fact on the question of bad faith. 
Since defendant, as moving party, had the burden of proof, it was not necessary for 
plaintiff to put in affidavit-evidence on the issue of bad faith. Plaintiff's affidavit was short 
only because defendant did not meet his burden on the many issues raised by the pleadings. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah case law supports the proposition that finders agreements are not barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. In any event defendant has failed to show as a matter of law that there is 
no genuine issue of fact for the trial court. The lower court's award of summary judgment 
on counts I and II of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be reversed. The award 
of summary judgment as to Counts III and IV was by stipulation and need not be disturbed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT J. DeBRY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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